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rights of an accused in a criminal case or even those of a respondent in an
administrative proceeding. But it can insure against one-man investigating
committees, require the screening of defamatory matter in executive session
before it is publicized, and provide for a limited right of reply and even for a
brief cross-examination of the accusing witness.
We are thus left with Mr. Taylor's "political" solution and his conclusion
that unless "the temper of the country" is changed, little can be accomplished
by statute. Of course this is a political problem and the censure of Senator
McCarthy (regardless of the text of the censure resolution) has done more to
warn those who might desire to follow in his footsteps than a score of statutes
or court decisions. But the temper of the country can also be affected by agita-
tion for a code of fair procedures. No less important in the creation of that
public morality are works as perceptive and searching as Grand Inquest.
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THE LEGAL COMMUNITY OF MANKIND. By Walter Schiffer. New York:
Columbia University Press, 1954. Pp. x, 367. $5.50.
"[T] HE more one reads of man's notions about the meaning and method of
civil society, the more often is one inclined in despair to say that truth has as
little to do with politics as it has with most politicians .... If ideas in politics
more than elsewhere are the children of practical needs, none the less it is true,
that the actual world is the result of men's thoughts. The existing arrange-
ment of political forces is dependent at least as much upon ideas, as it is upon
men's perception of their interests."' This in a nutshell is the problem with
which the late Walter Schiffer deals in his study The Lcgal Community of
Mankind. He attempts "to describe and explain the growth of the pattern of
thought on which this idea of a universal organization [the League of Nations]
was based, and demonstrate to what extent this idea was contradictory in
itself."'2 In his endeavor the author traces the evolution of the concept of
universal organization, from the breakdown of medieval Christian unity through
the drafting of the League of Nations Covenant, by expounding the ideas
and doctrines of political thinkers beginning with Grotius, Pufendorf, Wolff,
and Kant up to the positivist and progressive schools of the nineteenth and
twentieth centuries. Mr. Schiffer's scholarly and comprehensive work is bound
to have a notable impact on present thinking on the nature, function, and
potentiality of a world organization.
The excellence and importance of this study, with its high scholarship and
impressive erudition, require one to examine carefully Mr. Schiffer's presup-
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positions and the manner in which he approaches the subject. The author's
decision not "to analyze in detail the relationship between the ideas which con-
stitute the object of this study and the political and social conditions out of
which they grew" 3 suggests the main weakness of the work. By disregarding
the socio-political matrix of these ideas, his presentation becomes merely his-
torical. Figgis has reminded us: "We must not study the political theories
apart from the political conditions. We must never lose sight of the connection
between theory and practice. In actual facts, we shall find, if not always the
cause of new doctrines, at least the conditions of their prevalence and
efficacy . . . . We are always in danger of reading our thoughts into their
words; of drawing modem deductions from non-modem premises.'" Un-
fortunately this is exactly the mistake the author commits. By uprooting ideas
and doctrines from the soil in which they were nurtured, he deprives them of
their experience content In any society, political and legal ideas and doctrines
are manipulated to promote specific objectives: they are primarily used as
justifications or rationalizations for expedient actions.3 Ideas concerning the
development of a world order are no exception to this social process. It will
be instructive to examine some ideas which were manipulated, toward the end
of the period of Christian unity, as instruments in the formation of nation-
states.
Despite the rather detached attitude he took in his De lure Belli Ac Pads0
Grotius was by no means the sterile doctrinaire, shying away from the problems
of his day, that Mr. Schiffer describes. 7 De lurc Belli is a further elabora-
tion of ideas Grotius previously expressed in his Commnentary on the Law of
Prize and Booty (De lure Praedae Commentarius)-a study very likely
undertaken to justify the interests of the Great United Company of East Indies
in trading freely with the Indies and in defending its ships against Portuguese
vessels." And at the time of the Peace Treaty between the Low Countries and
Spain, when Spain contested their right to the East Indies trade, Grotius
3. P. 10.
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6. See Van Vollenhoven, Grotius and Geneva, 6 BIBLIOTHECA VISSERIAZNA 11 (1926).
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organized according to the measure of his intelligence, with those who are of his ovM
kdnd ...... Prolegovwna to his DE IuRE BELLI Ac PAcs Linm TR.s para. 6, p. II
(Scott ed. 1925). Of this, one commentator has remarked: "Grotius is here much nearer
to the truth as revealed by modem psychology than is Hobbes, who regarded society as
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revised chapter XII of this Commentary and published it separately as his
famous Mare Liberum. 9 Grotius himself enunciated his motives:
"[W] hen I saw that the commerce with that India which is called East was
of great importance for the safety of our country and it was quite clear
that this commerce could not be maintained without arms while the Portu-
guese were opposing it through violence and trickery, I gave my attention
to stirring up the minds of our fellow-countrymen to guard bravely what
had been felicitously begun, putting before their eyes the justice and equity
of the case .... But when a short time thereafter, some hope for peace
or truce with our country was extended by the Spaniards but with an un-
just condition demanded by them, namely, that we refrain from commerce
with India, a part of that Commentary in which it was shown that this
demand rested neither upon law nor upon any probable color of law, I
determined to publish separately under the title Mare Liberum, with the
intention and hope that I might encourage our countrymen not to with-
draw a tittle from their manifest right and might find out whether it were
possible to induce the Spaniards to treat the case a little more leniently
after it had been deprived not only of its strongest argument but also of
the authority of their own people. Both of these considerations were not
2)10without success ....
In formulating his doctrines Grotins assumed a realistic stand, never losing
sight of existing conditions. His law of nations "grew of and grew tip with
the political facts of the time and its fundamental conception was an accurate
reflection of an existing political system . . . ."' On the facts, he was justified,
for instance, in depicting the patrimonial state as physically represented by
the king or the prince and in making them internationally responsible: "When
Grotius thought of the duties of sovereign as the duties of individual men, he
was not thinking metaphorically. He was thinking in terms of the moral and
legal duties that rested on Ferdinand and Louis and Philip and James ...."1-
Recognizing the breakdown of Christian unity, as it was steadily undermined
by the growing nation-states, Grotius foresaw the dangerous consequences of
complete atomization of society into independent states. This fear motivated
him to formulate a system of law of nations applicable to rulers and individ-
uals alike.13 He advocated a complete subjection of international relations to
this law. 14 And he relied on a natural law applicable to the community of
mankind in an attempt to salvage some of the strength of the crumbling struc-
ture of medieval Christian society and thus to span the widening gulf between
the newly established political units.
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Similarly the real meaning and function of the ideas of other thinkers dis-
cussed in vacuo by Mir. Schiffer could be discovered by examining them in
their factual context. As the centrifugal force of the emerging nation-state
increased, the doctrines of territoriality and nationality, hitherto nebulous and
vague, became convenient vehicles for consolidating the position of the state.1'5
This tendency is clearly discernible in the writings of Vattel, whose thought
was dominated by a policy of nation-state independence which left very little
room for a world order: "It is for each Nation to decide what its conscience
demands of it, what it can or can not do ... and therefore it is for each Nation
to consider and determine what duties it can fulfill towards others without
failing in its duty towards itself."' 0 A more atomistic view of international
society could hardly be found.
Because of his inadequate clarification of the purposes of the various writers
of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, the author glosses over the intrin-
sically opposite nature of the doctrines which operated towards the fall of the
Christian unity, and the ideas which formed the basis for the League of
Nations. The medieval writers were bent primarily on the destruction of the
rule of the Church, the binding force of Western cohesiveness, with only an
incidental conservative effort to preserve some of the familiar links among
the new political units. The supporters of the League, however, sought to re-
verse this trend and promote unity in the world community through the oper-
ation of an international organization.
Obviously, an attempt to attain this modem objective through application
of traditional and sacrosanct doctrines of international law, abstracted from the
events which created them, has slight chance of success. And if Mr. Schiffer's
is the only approach, his conclusion is undeniable-the League was doomed to
failure. Unhappily, 1%r. Schiffer is not alone. The hypnotic grip of ancient
doctrines is evident in this typically positivistic despair for international pro-
tection of human rights: "to make individuals direct subjects of international
law ... has no chance to be realized for theoretical as well as practical rea-
sons ... ." Dean Pound has pointed to the fallacy: "the seventeenth- and
eighteenth-century theory of international law grew out of and was an interpre-
tation of the facts, whereas the nineteenth- and twentieth-century applications
of that theory ... do not interpret and grow out of the facts, but give the facts
a juristic or metaphysical cast to make them fit the theory."' 8 A plea for strict
application of Grotius' doctrines would be absurd today. But if viewed in his-
torical context, Grotius, by his practical, creative approach to the problems of
15. VA.N VOLL=NHOVE, THE LAW OF PEACE 39-41 (1936); Vinogradoff, Historical
Types of International Law, 1 BMLIOTHE.A VISSERI NA 46, 58 (1923).
16. 1 VArEL, THE LAW OF NATIO.S OR THE PRINCIPLES OF NATURAL LAv., 6 (Fen-
wick ed. 1916). See further ran Vollenhoven, stpra note 6, at 78-81 (1926).
17. Kunz, Present Day Effort at International Protection of Human Rights A
General Analytical and Critical Introduction, 45 Peoc Ams. Soc'v Or INTL LAw 117
(1951) (emphasis added).
18. Pound, supra note 11, at 75.
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his day, does offer a healthy antidote to the petrifying influence of legal posi-
tivism. However valuable its logical systematization may be, positivistic
thought has frozen international law into a rigid system of rules and has
strangled creative efforts to formulate legal prescriptions which meet existing
needs.") By invoking doctrines out of touch with reality, the positivists have
pushed the function of legal prescriptions as instruments of social control far
into the background. Thus, for example, the "act of state" doctrine, by many
categorically defended today, was originally invented as a "useful theory of
those who wished to free the representatives of States from any rule of moral
or reason. Now the State, ex hypothesi, was not bound by any objective
rule, could not sin, could not be punished, could not even blush." 20 In the
infancy of nation-states this doctrine was understandable, though unnecessary.
But to cling to such a principle today, when a few individuals can wipe out
whole nations, is inexcusable. 21 A similar air of unrealism hangs about the
traditional laws of war which attempted, through concepts of "state of war"
and "neutrality," to localize war in time and space. Under present circum-
stances a sharp dichotomy of war and peace, 22 or belligerence and neutrality,
is outdated. Likewise, the doctrine of diplomatic protection of citizens abroad
is obsolete and inadequate in a world where the increasing number of in-
dividuals crossing national boundaries demands the recognition of interna-
tional rights which can be claimed without the intercession of the state. The
creation of international organizations raises, of course, a host of new prob-
lems which cannot be solved by the principles of an atomistic international
law.
Given his positivistic and abstract approach, it is not surprising that Mr.
Schiffer finds in the alleged logical inconsistencies of the Covenant the seeds
of destruction of the League 23 and that he refuses a priori to recognize that
a functioning political institution founded on such inconsistent principles can
have any potential effects :24 "the League was an attempt to deal with the
19. For further discussion of the inadequacies of the traditional international law,
see McDougal, International Law, Power, and Policy: A Contemporary Conception, 82
HAGUE RECUEIL DES CouRs 143-62 (1952).
20. Idelson, The Law of Nations and the Indzidual, 30 TRAN S. GRoTlus Soc. 52
(1945).
21. The fiction of the personality of the state is still frequently resorted to, helping
to obscure the fact that "acts of state" are acts of individuals acting on its behalf. See,
e.g., KENNAN, REAmITIE OF AMEICAN FOREIGN Poticy 49 (1954). Although refusing
to recognize "morality as a general criterion for the determination of the behaviour of
states and above all as a criterion for measuring and comparing the behaviour of different
states," he still does not look at "acts of state" in terms of the morality of the individual
acting on behalf of the state. His concept, carried to its logical conclusion, would wipe
out the principle of the Nuremberg Trial.
22. See McDougal, War and Peace: Factual Continuum With Mlultiple Legyal Con-





problem arising from political divergencies between the states into which the
world was divided, by methods the successful functioning of which presup-
posed an essential unity of purpose among the peoples of the world, and
therefore the absence of political discord. Without having reached the highest
degree of perfection mankind could not hope, through the League, to per-
form the task which this institution was supposed to accomplish."2 But
conditions 'vere changed by the mere formation of this new political insti-
tution, and there is reasonable ground to believe that its operation would, in
the long run, have modified political discord. Furthermore, Mr. Schiffer's
rigid "either-or" approach, which assumes that world organization must be
either a cooperation among the states, or a perfect world state,20 discharging
all state functions on a world scale, ignores the possible development of
entirely new political institutions. Yet, paradoxically, the author chose as
the point of departure of his study the emergence of a new social institution,
the nation-state. "The continuity of life is not the continuity of its institu-
tions .... Organizations are removed from without, they are reformed, or
scrapped and replaced. 27 A few years ago no one conceived of a political
institution such as the European Coal and Steel Community.
Unfortunately, for all its superb scholarship, Mr. Schiffer's study illumi-
nates only one aspect of the development of ideas, calling forth-perhaps
unwittingly--examination of the areas which remain in the dark. In the end
Mr. Schiffer has only confirmed Mannheim's insight that "thinking in terms
of humanity as a whole is no longer chimerical dreaming, but the demand
of the hour." "This vision may still be beyond the reach of many of our
self-styled 'hard-boiled' realists whose 'realism' consists in thinking and act-
ing according to the ideas of a bygone age."2
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LEGAL CONTROLS OF INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT. By Julius Stone. New York:
Reinhart and Company, Inc., 1954. Pp. lv, 851. $12.00.
JuuLus Stone is best known to American readers for his two works in juris-
prudence, Law and Society (in three volumes, with Sidney Post Simpson),
and The Province and Function of Law. The latter is both the most authori-
tative interpretation of the views of Stone's teacher and former colleague at
Harvard Law School, Dean Roscoe Pound, and also perhaps the most detailed
and comprehensive venture in sociological jurisprudence produced to date in
the common law countries.
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